VOLUME 11 ISSUE 1 SPRING 2025

44 Spirituality Studies 11-1 Spring 2025 According to Jung, as he writes in Psychological Types (1921), meaning is not merely a human construct but a fundamental principle of organic life, which manifests in psychological processes. “The question ‘why’ and ‘for what’ can be raised anywhere, because every organic structure consists of a complex network of purposeful functions” (Jung CW8 1916, 314), and therefore, “no psychological fact can ever be fully explained solely in terms of causality; as a phenomenon of life, it is always inseparably linked to the continuity of the life process, so that it is not only something that has developed but also something that is continuously evolving and creative. Since it evolves, it is also preparing itself for the future” (Jung CW61921, 598). Fantasy, as the greatest flourishing of psychological life in which unconscious contents manifest, must be understood both causally and teleologically. When interpreted causally, it refers to a physiological state or the result of preceding events. When understood teleologically, it contains a symbol striving to capture a particular goal using the material available to it (Jung CW6 1921,600, 655). Jung has no doubt about which perspective is more important for his conception of psychology. In his view, most unconscious contents can be satisfactorily explained from the “standpoint of finality” rather than physiology, which is merely a prerequisite for the existence of psychic content but not a determinant of its nature. The law governing fantasy as a psychological phenomenon, according to Jung, can only be a psychological law (Jung CW6 1921, 601 n. 308). This also serves as a defense of Jung’s distinct approach to psychology, whose material he refuses to reduce to a mere epiphenomenon of biology. The causal analytical method has its place in psychology only when a psychic state is caused by an immediate physiological reason, such as hunger, fear, or sexual drive – conditions that do not manifest through psychological symbolism but rather through “symptomatic signs” (Jung CW6 1921, 658). In such cases, there is no reason to consider meaning and purpose, but rather “desire and striving”, with Jung referencing Freud’s concept of “wish fulfillment” and Adler’s notion of “power struggle”. However, when this symptomatic perspective is applied to constructive, anticipatory, and meaningful psychic contents – which, as we have already mentioned, Jung considers to be in the majority – this results in a confusion of meaning with cause and of symbol with symptom. An analytical method that works only with the given material and does not anticipate the subject’s purpose necessarily simplifies and infantilizes the subject. Jung illustrates this with the example of Saint Peter, whose vision of a feast can be interpreted either as a longing for higher knowledge, or simply as the result of not having eaten enough before falling asleep: “Analysis and reduction lead to causal truth; by itself, this does not help us live but only causes resignation and despair. In contrast, understanding the inner value of a symbol leads to constructive truth, which helps us live; it inspires hope and expands the possibilities for future development” (Jung CW4 1916, 292–293). Just as Jung defends the distinctiveness of psychology as a discipline in contrast to biology, he also sees it as a unique skill of the psychologist to distinguish a symbol from a symptom, asserting that this ability cannot be cultivated without philosophical education. In his view, biology and physiology are fields from which a psychologist may draw when addressing problems arising from a patient’s bodily needs. However, an “intellectual problem” requires “constructive care” through “philosophical parallels”. Only within this framework, he argues, can we even begin to operate with the concept of meaning (Jung CW6 1921, 589). 3 Crystallization of Meaning One of the aims of Kant’s Critique of Judgment was to determine under what conditions we can recognize particular purposive structures in nature. Although these structures appear only within the realm of our sensory experience, their deeper significance extends into the sphere of freedom, which is not dependent on sensory perception. Kant demonstrates that our mind is naturally inclined to perceive purposiveness in nature, even though it cannot be derived purely from mechanical natural laws. This principle, which he calls the “hidden technique of nature” or “free creation of nature”, functions as a bridge between the realm of necessity and the realm of freedom. His ambition was to show that our understanding of matter encompasses not only its physical nature but also the way in which we judge it as part of a higher order. The connection between Kant’s Critique of Judgment and Jungian psychology can be found in paragraph 58 of the Critique. Here, Kant uses the image of crystallization, during which an until-then invisible aesthetic structure is revealed. What takes shape through crystallization, Kant characterizes as a “reminder [note: of the fluid]”, which could be understood as an essence, and further as “a fluid at rest”, which might be interpreted as potential. The way in which this structure, made visible only through crystallization, participates in the substance is described by Kant as “a true

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