2 6 S p i r i t ua l i t y S t u d i e s 7 - 1 S p r i n g 2 0 2 1 [T]he empiricist error consists not in the belief that experiment has a certain utility, which is obvious, but in thinking that there is a common measure between principial knowledge and experiment, and in attributing to the latter an absolute value, whereas in fact it can only have a bearing on modes, never on the very principles of Intellect and of Reality; this amounts to purely and simply denying the possibility of a knowledge other than the experimental and sensory. “According to empiricists, all knowledge is derived from sensory experience” (Schuon 2009, 30). It is somewhat of a paradox that modern science, although secular in outlook, has its foundations in metaphysics even though it has broken away from its roots [7]. What is paramount here is that “[m]etaphysical evidence takes precedence over ‘physical’ or ‘phenomenal’ certainty” (Schuon 1990a, 15). Indian philosopher Jadunath Sinha (1892–1978) points out that Hinduism, known as the sanātana dharma (eternal religion), also advocates this truth: “There is no empirical psychology in India. Indian psychology is based on metaphysics.” (1986, xviii) [8]. Modern science and, by extension, modern psychology have not come to terms with this critique. The quandary of modern Western psychology persists: “To postulate a science without metaphysic is a flagrant contradiction.” (Schuon 1984a, 131). To ignore traditional modes of knowledge that are of supra-individual origin is to do a grave injustice to what psychology truly is. “[I]n metaphysics there is no empiricism: principial knowledge cannot stem from any experience, even though experiences – scientific or other – can be the occasional causes of the intellect’s intuitions.” (Schuon 1991, vii). It is this kind of knowledge that allows us to traverse the intermediary world of the human psyche, when participating in a revealed spiritual form. Since its inception modern Western psychology has never been neutral, nor can it be. On the contrary, “[s]cience … is based on presuppositions” (Bateson 1980, 27) – it has a definite belief system from which it arises and it – rarely questions its own assumptions. Bishop Kallistos Ware makes the following point: “[M]odern science is not value-neutral. It does not offer merely an ‘objective’ account of the ‘facts’, but it makes a series of assumptions that have far-reaching consequences on the spiritual level.” (Ware, 1998, xlii). It needs to be remembered that “[t]he concept of mental health depends on our concept of the nature of man.” (Fromm 1955, 67). In the same way, psychopathology requires a concept of health, and without knowing in what health consists, an adequate diagnosis and treatment of psychic maladies cannot be made. As Gai Eaton (1921–2010) points out (1990, 8): “To diagnose the ills of the time one must possess standards of health.” Rescuing the human psyche from the clutches of modern Western psychology requires challenging the widespread acceptance of scientism, “the belief that the scientific method and scientific findings are the sole criterion for truth” (Chittick 2009, 48; see also Sheldrake 2013). Freud (1989b, 71) declared his allegiance to scientific fundamentalism as follows: “No, our science is no illusion. But an illusion it would be to suppose that what science cannot give us we can get elsewhere.” This overwhelmingly narrow interpretation of science is reminiscent of another well-known scientistic assertion by Bertrand Russell (1872–1970): “[W]hat science cannot discover, mankind cannot know” (Russell 1997, vii). Science, according to Freud (1933, 196), represents the only legitimate means of obtaining true knowledge: “[T]here are no sources of knowledge of the universe other than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations – in other words, what we call research – and alongside of it no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or divination.” The reason that scientism endures, as the American historian and social critic Theodore Roszak (1933–2011) points out, is that it has been adopted as the new faith of the modern world to replace religion: “Science is our religion because we cannot, most of us, with any living conviction see around it.” (1972, 134–35). What is altogether misunderstood regarding the phenomenon of scientism is that its totalitarian claims contradict its essential assertions, as the renowned scholar of comparative religion, Huston Smith (1919–2016), perceptively observed (1992, 16): “[T]he contention that there are no truths save those of [note: modern] science is not itself a scientific truth; in affirming it scientism contradicts itself.” Scientism thus confines the scope of psychology to what is exclusively horizontal, denying its most important facet, the vertical dimension, of the Spirit: “[S]cientism encourages man to stop his search for inwardness at the level of psychic contents” (Needleman 1976, 131). An important qualification needs to be added here: “There is no conflict between science and religion when the rightful domain of each is honored.” (Smith 1995, 203). Swiss psychiatrist Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) offered an acute criticism of the fragmented mentality that undergirds modern Western psychology: “[T]he cancer of all [note: modern] psychology up to now [note: is] … the cancer of the doctrine of subject-object cleavage of the world.” (Binswanger 1958, 11). A key figure responsible for this pervasive dichotomy in modern science is René Descartes (1596–1650), who put forward his own brand of mind-body dualism, which continues to have an enduring influence on the development
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