2 0 S p i r i t ua l i t y S t u d i e s 5 - 2 Fa l l 2 0 1 9 over them. What is the possible nature of the relationship cannot exercise my power, which “I” exercise over the world, 59–60). If the other is to be preserved in their inviolability, “I” we address ‘You’ in the dimension of Majesty” (Lévinas 1997c, the Other means to give. But to give to a sovereign lord, the one “I”. “To accept the Other means to accept their hunger. To accept create a number, the collectivity “I–Thou” is not the plural of every imperialism of “the same”. “I” and the Other do not needs to be kept. Their difference precedes every initiative, ent, that is, the distance suggesting difference of the Other solve in “the same”, the Other needs to be accepted as differ- ship cannot be a representation, since the other would dis- “I” would be kept at the same time? If an authentic relation- ship to “Thou” possible in which its radical exteriority against ment, establishment of collectivity “We”? Is such a relation- scendence to the other take place if its aim is not adjust- How does the ethical relationship, the relationship of tran- own subjectivity of “I”. encounter of “I” and the irreducible diversity of “Thou” creates fers (things) or resists (persons) my ownership. Ultimately, the 1997c, 23). I am at home in the world, because the world of- in the way of dwelling, that is, like at one’s home (Lévinas “I am I” (as A = A), but as a result that it exists in the world tification of “the same” in “I” does not occur as clear tautology ence, it cannot abandon “itself”, it is not someone else. Idenperson. “I” blends with “itself”, it is the same against all differ- in its transformations, it has a structure of a subject, the first “I” is the original self-creation of identification. It is identical of one’s own identity across everything that happens to it. an identity, or rather, to be in a process of constant finding What does it mean to be “I”? In particular, “I” means to have point of the relationship is “I”. the relationship. This element that remains in the starting essence remains a starting point, it serves as an entrance to Thou is the other in the relationship with an element whose ical difference of the other, however, is possible only when only possible ethical relationship to the Other. The very rad- difference of the other. Transcendence to the infinite is the Thou” to one system –“We”– that would destroy the radical not reversible. Its mutual changeability would connect “I and son of the other. Relationship to the other, by definition, is is transcendence, confirmation of “to be different” in the per- forms the Other to “the same”. The opposite of neutralization dignity and eventually, it is unjust because it violently trans- power, it is “egoistic”, impersonal, inhuman, without respect to appropriation of what is. ontology is actually philosophy of (meaning “I have the power to state”), that is, depredatory would be then included in the register of “acts of virtue”. (patience), love (non-violence), justice (non-abuse of power) and generosity), acceptance of the Other in their exteriority care for their lack, unconditional giving (high-mindedness respect for their uniqueness, responsibility (non-indifference), for them. The acts of recognition of the Other (reverence), own commitment to them, readiness to accept responsibility tion, call openness to the other, willingness to acknowledge coercive principle, Lévinas’s ethics would, for such disposi- tion of a moral subject to act in accordance with an objective If Kant’s ethical concept deals the term “virtue” as a disposi- tionally binds by the heteronomous law “Thou shalt not kill!”. is determined by the appeal of responsibility, which uncondi- and forces, in the ethics of encounter with the other morality imperative of a universal moral law that commits, commands will but by heteronomy of face of the other. Instead of the except that this desire is not determined by the autonomy of the call of the other resembles rather Kantian deontologism, never takes place) and its realization through responding to The philosophy of metaphysical desire for fulfillment (which position of responsibility to the Other. created only after acceptance of this challenge, taking the the abyss to the separated “Thou”. Subjectivity of “I” is fully challenge for the unstoppable “I” so that it attempts to cross of unique responsibility, it is a permanent and unfulfillable causes upheaval and challenge. It evokes in “I” consciousness phan. Encounter with the other is a shock, their silent face calls, begs, requires. It is a look of a stranger, widow and or- (Lévinas 1997c, 50). The other, through their naked presence, themselves… decomposes the form they offer in every moment” ifestation of face is already a dialogue. The one who manifests first one, reveal their face, their presence. “Face speaks. Man- calling, or revelation. The Other manifests themselves to the speaking, ethical attitude to the other in responding to their istic being and apologizes for it. Egoistic thinking resides in logue with “Thou”, it assigns the other a right over my ego- but as one’s own acting walk. When “I” finds itself in a dia- movement of transcendence, not as thinking of the other ever, is by definition irreversible. “I” performs it as a breaking beyond every totality, like face to face. This movement, how- intellectual opinion. In a dialogue, “I” comes out of its ipseity, manifestation of sense, presence that cannot be reduced to ing, but purely relational, it should be immediate revelation, logue. The dialogue, however, cannot be explorative, reveal- to the other? Lévinas replies that it has the nature of a dia-
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